In August 2024, a wave of protests rocked Indonesia, ostensibly in response to political machinations aimed at anointing a successor to President Joko Widodo, popularly known as Jokowi. Very little information has circulated about these protests in the English-speaking world. To get a sense of the deeper issues at play, we reached out to anarchist participants in different parts of Indonesia.

We interviewed Frans Ari Prasetyo, an independent researcher and photographer in Bandung, and M, a participant in an anarchist collective in Jogjakarta. The photographs are also by Frans Ari Prasetyo.

“Never trust government.” A protest in Bandung on August 22, 2024.

According to the news that reaches us in the United States, the ongoing protests are reportedly a response to a change in election law, and more generally, a corrupt political dynasty. Is there more to the story?

Frans Ari Prasetyo: This recent revolt highlights the peak of popular discontent with Jokowi’s two-term presidency, especially among younger Indonesians. Although this protest will not lead to President Jokowi’s removal, as he will retire in October 2024, it shows that social movements in Indonesia, particularly in Bandung, have become more dynamic and diverse since the end of the authoritarian era with the 1998 reforms. These protests emerged in response to Jokowi’s attempts to alter the law regarding the regional executive elections that were established by the 1998 reforms.

The Constitutional Court issued two rulings concerning the age limit for regional executive positions. First, it ruled that candidates must be at least 30 years old when they register. This decision could prevent President Jokowi’s youngest son, who is only 29, from running for a regional executive position. The second ruling annulled the 25% quorum required for political parties to nominate regional head candidates. The Court lowered the threshold to 6.5-10% of the valid votes in each region. This change allows smaller and medium-sized parties to nominate their own candidates, giving voters more options for leadership. Previously, only larger parties could nominate candidates due to the 25% benchmark. However, this ruling also opens the door for the former Jakarta governor, who is popular with the opposition and has high electability, as well as other opposition-backed candidates.

Jokowi’s actions might be seen as undermining democratic principles. This could be driven by a desire to maintain power and protect himself while retaining a strong political influence even after his presidency ends in October 2024. There is still much work needed to advance democratic inclusiveness, accountability, and quality of life, both in Indonesia and globally. However, progress seems to be slowing rather than advancing. Many Indonesians fear a potential collapse of representative government. Additionally, there are other laws under consideration, notably the Military and Police Laws, which could have significant implications.

A protest in Bandung on August 22, 2024.

M: The protests in Indonesia are driven by a combination of factors including changes to election laws, widespread corruption, economic grievances, and dissatisfaction with political leadership and police brutality. While the changes to election laws and the influence of corrupt political dynasties are central to the current unrest, they are part of a broader context.

The Core Issues Driving the Protests


Election Law Changes: The protests have been significantly fueled by recent amendments to Indonesia’s election laws. Many Indonesians view these changes as undermining democratic principles and increasing the influence of entrenched political elites. Some see the amendments as facilitating the manipulation of electoral outcomes, which has raised concerns about fairness and transparency in the democratic process.


Political Corruption: Corruption remains a longstanding issue in Indonesian politics. The perception of widespread corruption among political elites, including members of powerful political dynasties, has contributed to popular frustration. Many protesters are demanding a fair trial and punishment for the offenders, as well as greater accountability and transparency from relevant institutions such as the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK).


Additional Factors


Historical Grievances: Indonesia has a history of political turbulence, and recent protests are influenced by historical grievances, including previous movements against authoritarian rule and corruption. The legacy of the Suharto era and the 1998 Reformasi (“Reformation”) movement continues to impact people sentiment and activism to this day.


Economic Discontent: Economic issues also play a significant role. Rising inequality, unemployment, and dissatisfaction with economic policies have fueled discontent. Many Indonesians feel that the benefits of economic growth have not been evenly distributed, exacerbating social and economic tensions.


Social Media and Activism: The role of social media in organizing and amplifying dissent cannot be overlooked. Social media platforms have enabled activists to mobilize and spread information rapidly, contributing to the scale and intensity of the protests. This led to increased popular oversight of their performance and any crimes they commit. Hashtag movements have also expanded, with the term “no viral, no justice” emerging in response to ongoing issues.


Current Leadership: President Jokowi has faced criticism for failures in handling corruption and political reforms and issuing unpopular draft laws. Over the ten years he has been in power, Jokowi’s administration has been accused of not doing enough to address the systemic issues that contribute to popular disillusionment. Jokowi’s focus during his presidency has been to promote forms of development that have been detrimental to society and the environment. This has generated significant criticism and conflict at the grassroots level, where communities are directly affected by his policies.


Police Brutality: There is anger about police violence against protesters, arbitrary arrests, mistreatment of detainees, abuse of power, corruption, the increase in the national budget for armaments, the use of tear gas in demonstrations, professional misconduct, and police involvement in the “protection” of illegal online gambling, human trafficking, drug trafficking, and the “security” of mining and palm oil plantation areas in conflict with local communities. Critics argue that this reflects systemic issues within the police force, such as lack of accountability, inadequate oversight, and a tendency toward authoritarian practices. Human rights organizations, activists, and other people often call for reforms to improve policing practices, ensure greater transparency, and protect civil liberties. Anarchists call to end the institution and fight them.



A protest in Bandung on August 22, 2024.

Offer a brief overview of previous powerful social movements in Indonesia that set a precedent for the current wave of activity, and give us a chronology of the significant events leading up to the current unrest.

Frans Ari Prasetyo: Before this protest, there was another demonstration against the appointment of a controversial police chief as the chairman of the KPK (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, “Corruption Eradication Commission”). Many feared this appointment would diminish the KPK’s neutrality and hinder its ability to effectively combat corruption. In 2019, people held the largest protest since the 1998 reforms, known as #reformasidikorupsi. These demonstrations, and the state’s response to them, caused a dramatic drop in public trust in the Jokowi government.

The #reformasidikorupsi protests lasted almost two weeks and took place in several cities. Tragically, police killed several protesters. Many hoped this resistance would lead to a second Reform, similar to the first Reform that overthrew the New Order (Suharto) regime. However, Jokowi managed to calm the situation by reaching out to opposition parties and offering them a role within the governing bloc. Notably, Jokowi also succeeded in fostering cooperation between the military and police, which worked together extensively during the protests.

On May 1, 2019, autonomous groups took to the streets. Most of them joined the black bloc. Although this was not the first black bloc protest, it was the largest to date, surprising many. Given the context of the ongoing demonstrations, perhaps we should not have been so surprised.

In 2022, large protests erupted after the passage of a controversial Criminal Code (KUDP), which many compared to colonial-era laws. Prior to the approval of the Criminal Code and the subsequent protests, in October 2020, the House of Representatives (DPR) and the Indonesian government passed the neoliberal “omnibus law.” This law aimed to boost employment during the pandemic and accelerate changes to laws perceived as hindering economic growth, development, and investment.

Facing constitutional limits that prevented him from seeking a third term, Jokowi appointed his brother-in-law as Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court. He also considered relaxing the age requirements for vice presidential candidates, which could allow Jokowi’s eldest son to run alongside Prabowo in the 2024 presidential election. Prabowo, a former New Order general with a history of human rights violations, including the kidnapping of activists during the 1998 reforms and military operations in Papua, sought refuge in Jordan after the reforms. He returned to Indonesia during President Abdurahman Wahid’s (Gusdur) administration and engaged in political activities, leading to the founding of the Gerindra Party (Gerakan Indonesia Raya) and his appointment as its chairman.

Prabowo and Gibran, Jokowi’s son, won the 2024 election, marking a step backward toward the New Order.

A protest in Bandung on August 22, 2024.

M: Here, I will offer you a short chronology.

A Chronology of Events

2017: The Jakarta gubernatorial election saw significant unrest and large-scale protests against incumbent Governor Ahok, primarily fueled by allegations of religious blasphemy with strong racist tendencies (he is of Chinese ethnicity). Ahok’s defeat marked a rise in political and social polarization.

2018-2019: Indonesia experienced several high-profile corruption scandals involving high-ranking officials and ministries; these exacerbated popular frustration with the political elite.

2019: The re-election of President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) catalyzed protests by opposition groups alleging electoral fraud and criticizing Jokowi’s policies. This period also increased popular scrutiny of the influence of Jokowi’s political dynasties and nepotism.

2020-2021: The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated existing issues including economic instability. People’s dissatisfaction grew over the handling of the pandemic and perceived corruption in relief efforts.

2022: Demonstrations erupted in response to new Job Creation Laws (the “Omnibus Law”) perceived to favor capitalist interests over workers’ rights. These protests highlighted ongoing concerns about labor rights and economic inequality. 2022 also saw an extraordinary case involving a senior member of the National Police, Ferdy Sambo, who was serving as the head of the Propam Division. (“Kadiv Propam” stands for the Head of the Division of Profession and Security, who has the authority to perform the duties of the Propam Division, which relate to the development of professional standards and security within the internal environment of the National Police organization.) He was implicated in the premeditated murder of Brigadier Joshua Hutabarat. Although Sambo was initially sentenced to death, the final verdict was life imprisonment. This incident drew significant attention nationally and internationally. It marked the first time that a General of the National Police was sentenced to life imprisonment in Indonesia.

2023-2024: Recent unrest has been fueled by a combination of dissatisfaction with electoral laws, allegations of corruption, high unemployment, and growing frustration with entrenched political dynasties. The ongoing protests reflect a continuation of the struggle for political change that has characterized Indonesia’s recent history.

A protest in Bandung on August 22, 2024.

Every movement involves different factions and currents with different ways of seeing the world and different goals. Can you describe the different groups on both sides of this conflict?

Frans Ari Prasetyo: In Indonesia’s relatively weak political culture, declining labor movement, and fragmented left, it is not uncommon for individuals to identify as anarchists or align with anarchist principles. This flexible and inclusive interpretation of anarchism seems to be the most widespread form of anarchist thought. The trend of social movement anarchism is particularly appealing to many young people in Indonesia, especially in Bandung, which has a long history of anarchism dating back to 2014. In Bandung, the autonomous movement released a compilation album titled “Mobilisasi Kemuakan” (“Mobilization of Disgust”), featuring twelve bands across various music subgenres, including punk, metal, and hip-hop. The album’s lyrics rejected the elections, and it included a special booklet critiquing representative democracy and contrasting it with popular mobilizations in the streets and “direct democracy.”

The “Mobilisasi Kemuakan” (“Mobilization of Disgust”) compilation, an assault on representative democracy.

Conversely, a prominent Marxist intellectual group in Indonesia supported Jokowi by mobilizing leftist activists, youth groups, and new voters through a flashy newspaper campaign before the 2014 presidential election. They justified this support by highlighting Jokowi’s opposition to Prabowo, a New Order military general with a history of human rights abuses. Ironically, Jokowi became a key advocate for Prabowo’s presidency in 2024, with Prabowo’s deputy being Jokowi’s eldest son.

The current protest movement appears to have fragmented into three main groups: university students; labor and mass organizations, including nationalist and religious groups; and informal groups focused on specific identity-based issues, such as women’s groups, artists, journalists, gender nonconformists, and religious minorities. Some of these groups are labeled by society, the police, and the state as “black-on-black” or “anarcho” groups.

These “anarchist” groups express themselves through various means, including shouting, singing, graffiti, and carrying flags, posters, and banners while lighting flares in the streets. They aim to raise awareness. Unfortunately, the current democratic system does not offer an effective means for waging a street-based struggle against the state or the police and military. This anarchist activity has left the public, the democratic process, and even the police somewhat unsettled. It is unfortunate that the police’s determination to win all public battles, particularly against anarchists, has led to a diminished public understanding and support for anarchists as part of civil society.

Student groups often play a crucial role in initiating protests and remain a prominent feature in mainstream media coverage as agents of change. They are widely regarded as intellectual and critical voices on government policies. As educated citizens, they have the potential to influence government decisions.

Student participation in strikes across Indonesia has fueled a new social movement, leading to increased political awareness. Students have become a powerful force in protests, with many identifying with the anarchist movement, which channels the energy and passion of the subversive youth.

A protest in Bandung on August 22, 2024.

M: The current resistance movement is generally divided into two groups: the elite within the government and political parties, and the community outside of the government. Those within the government who position themselves as “opposition” have their own political and party agendas; they also seek to secure their interests, which we don’t give a shit about at all. On the other hand, the recent extra-parliamentary movements include a diverse array of groups including veterans from the 1998 protests, human rights organizations and activists, women’s groups, environmentalists, journalists, Indigenous communities, farmers, fishermen, informal workers, academics, religious student organizations, Papua students, university professors, online transport drivers, political and popular figures, artists, comedians, mothers, high school students, punks, and, of course, anarchists, who are frequently scapegoated as instigators of unrest and “provocateurs.”

These extra-parliamentary groups have reached a point of exasperation with the increasingly reckless actions of Jokowi dynasty, especially as his presidency nears its end. Civil society is also expressing concern over the president-elect and vice-president-elect of the next administration, both of whom have very bad track records; they are set to be inaugurated in October 2024. The president-elect, Prabowo Subianto, is the son-in-law of former President Suharto; he was a high-ranking general under the Suharto regime and currently serves as Minister of Defense. He was involved in the abduction and disappearance of student activists in 1998, as well as a series of military operations during the Suharto era. He is also a very wealthy businessman. Gibran Rakabuming Raka, the vice-president-elect and Jokowi’s eldest son, has faced significant criticism due to nepotism and violations of the presidential age limit policy, as addressed by the Constitutional Court earlier this year.

A protest in Bandung on August 22, 2024.

We have seen “ACAB” scrawled on expropriated police shields and police vehicles during the unrest. What is the role of anti-authoritarians and anarchists in these protests? And how prevalent are broadly anti-authoritarian sentiments in Indonesian movements today?

Frans Ari Prasetyo: Since the rise of the global justice movement in the 1990s, anarchist ideas have seen a resurgence and continue to attract more adherents. Despite police repression and ongoing criticism from mainstream media, the movement has gained traction. Bandung, historically a hub for anarchist activity in Indonesia during the 1990s, remains home to a vibrant anarchist collective. The movement grew significantly in the mid-2000s through various efforts, including labor strikes, football hooliganism, protests against evictions, mutual aid efforts, and the distribution of books and pamphlets. Contributing factors including systemic economic inequality, gentrification, housing and land access issues, labor restructuring, and government repression have fueled widespread anger and confrontations with the police.

Anarchists have been dedicated to creating spaces aligned with their beliefs, exploring alternative forms of resistance and defining the boundaries of freedom, local protest, and transnational social movements.

Authoritarianism and militarism have been deeply ingrained in Indonesia’s experience since the New Order, and this militarization has expanded under Jokowi. The anarchist resistance to Jokowi’s government has been strong. The executive branch has consolidated power over police and military budgets to control protest movements. Although the police did not overtly campaign for Jokowi, their support contributed to his electoral success in various regions, reminiscent of their role during the New Order era.

Following the 2019 May Day Black Bloc, which led to the arrest of over 700 individuals in Bandung, it is clear that the police are increasingly determined to win all public confrontations, especially those involving anarchists. As a result, anarchists risk becoming isolated from some communities. In certain residential areas of Bandung, residents display banners reading “Anti-Anarcho,” “Anarko Dilarang!” (“Anarcho Forbidden!”), or “Daerah Ini Bebas Anarko” (“This Area is Anarcho-Free”). At the time, no one wanted to be associated with the subversive resistance movement.

In 2020, during the Omnibus protests, these banners began to disappear. However, the police continued to sweep through protests, arresting and committing acts of violence against civilians simply for wearing black. This targeting of anyone in black at protests, intended to isolate the anarchist movement, is having the opposite effect, driving many angry young people toward anarchism.

In 2022, fierce demonstrations and clashes with the police erupted following a deadly incident at a football stadium. As a result, “ACAB” and other innovative anti-police slogans and graffiti became increasingly popular.

A protest in Bandung on August 28, 2024.

M: The anarchist movement in Indonesia is growing. We are not only introducing anti-authoritarian ideas through discussions, publications, translation, social media, art, and music, but also actively participating in grassroots movements, particularly those opposing evictions and environmental destruction, as well as movements against police and the state. We advocate for decentralized movements employing direct action, build mutual aid networks around the archipelago, occupy land in conflict with the state and corporations, and address daily issues faced by the community at large, including our own issues. We achieve these things via organizing based on anarchist principles and fostering critical awareness within society.

We seek to raise awareness, exposing how manipulative and exploitative the state and corporations are towards society. We provide information about their misdeeds. As people get more informed, they also become more critical, losing faith in the mechanisms or strategies of the state, and in the police as well.

We are not alone in this effort. We have begun to build relationships with student groups, punks, artists, musicians, academics, queer communities, unemployed individuals, lawyers, informal workers, and others. The organic anarchist movement has been fulfilling its role while amplifying the growth of anti-authoritarian movements across various regions.

However, this is not without challenges. Some friction has occurred between the student groups and us anarchists. Indonesian students often wear their campus jackets during demonstrations and use ropes to create barriers, claiming this is to avoid the infiltration of police agents or provocateurs. They also tend to act as if they are the leaders of the protests, a form of vanguardism. Ironically, their slogans like “The People, United, Cannot Be Defeated” and “Beware of Provocation, Do Not Let Us Be Divided” contradict the reality on the ground when they separate themselves, claiming to represent the people. When tensions rise, it is usually anarchists who step forward, sparking the enthusiasm of other demonstrators and leading to clashes.

For example, in Bandung, when the situation became chaotic, with tear gas and stones flying, demonstrators scrambled to seek refuge on a campus, but students there blocked us, shouting, “Don’t let them in! They are not part of us!” A more distressing incident occurred in Sukabumi, where some demonstrators identified as “black bloc” were beaten by many students.

Students often fail to understand that the diversity of demonstrators is a reality they cannot avoid, which shows that the movement includes different social strata. Greater involvement of different groups fighting the same enemy is tactically important. The students also forget that anonymity is crucial for the safety of demonstrators, as police often target “black bloc” groups.

A protest in Bandung on August 28, 2024.

How does the movement vary in different parts of the country?

M: Indonesia, being a vast archipelago country, has regions with distinct resistance cultures influenced by local customs and issues. Java, as the center of finance, business, information, technology, and power, exhibits significant social, economic, and educational disparities. Resistance in each region often highlights local issues.

For instance, Kalimantan faces severe ecological threats from massive mining and palm oil expansions and the displacement of Indigenous communities. The controversial National Capital City (IKN) project, which aims to relocate the capital from Jakarta to Penajam Paser Utara in East Kalimantan, will devastate 256,142 hectares of natural forest and 68,189 hectares of sea. According to the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas), the IKN project budget is IDR 466.9 trillion, to be funded by the state and foreign investors. The IKN project also involves high-ranking officials with significant investments in the project, including Prabowo Subianto, the Minister of Defense, and Luhut Binsar Panjaitan, Indonesia’s Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment—and previously, a high-ranking general during the Suharto era.

The level of police repression varies by region, with actions in the eastern regions generally facing a harsher response from law enforcement.

A protest in Bandung on August 28, 2024.

What parts of society are in the streets? Have those who have been targeted by police before—such as organized labor, punks, soccer ultras, or West Papua independence protesters—taken part in these protests?

M: The soccer ultras have their own resentments due to the Kanjuruhan tragedy—a tragic event that occurred on October 1, 2022 at Kanjuruhan Stadium in Malang, Indonesia. A riot erupted after a football match between Arema FC and Persebaya Surabaya. Police used tear gas to disperse the crowd, leading to chaos as thousands of supporters rushed to the exits. The resulting crush and suffocation led to the deaths of over 135 people and many more injuries. This also highlighted issues related to crowd control and stadium safety.

The parents of the victims joined football associations in condemning the tragedy, demanding justice for those affected. A trial took place, resulting in the conviction of three low-ranking police officers and two match organizers, each of whom received a maximum sentence of only two and a half years. In the verdict, the judge stated that the tear gas affected hundreds of people due to wind direction towards the stands. The Kanjuruhan incident is recognized as the second-worst football disaster in history, following the 1964 tragedy at Estadio Nacional in Lima, Peru, which claimed the lives of over 300 people. To this day, the families of the deceased continue to demand accountability, justice, and transparency.

Meanwhile, people in Papua continue to fight for independence despite being negatively framed as an Armed Criminal Group by the state. This terminology, intensified during Jokowi’s presidency with covert support from Defense Minister Prabowo, is used to malign the Papuan independence movement. Unfortunately, corporate media often employs this label.

All of the groups you mentioned are direct victims of Jokowi’s government policies. Naturally, they are using this moment to unite and express their anger alongside other affected communities.

A protest in Bandung on August 28, 2024.

Frans Ari Prasetyo: Indonesia has undergone significant changes since the 1998 Reforms, including rapid growth in civil institutions, an expanding middle class, and the rise of a vibrant culture and metropolitan lifestyle. However, these changes have also raised concerns about media influence on public opinion, the rise of populist movements, and attempts to return to authoritarianism under the guise of development. During the politically-charged Reformasi era, anarchists protested against the dictatorship. This response was not surprising, as Indonesian anarchists have historically aligned with the working class and class struggle. However, the decline of the political left after the 1998 Reforms also led to a decline in anarchism.

Despite this, anarchists remain active in ongoing protests. Anarchism and the black bloc have become significant cultural identities for participants in youth protests in Bandung. Young people involved in music subcultures, football hooliganism, anti-colonial resistance in West Papua, and other movements often engage with anarchism, particularly through the black bloc.
Labor organizations have also been involved, especially in opposition to the Omnibus Law, which directly affects their interests. This involvement is notable given the ruling party’s influence over unions through their main coalition, which maintains a broad clientelist structure within civil society groups, including organized labor.

A protest in Bandung on August 28, 2024.

To what extent is this movement in dialogue with or influenced by the recent uprisings in other parts of the world such as those in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Bangladesh, or elsewhere?

M: I don’t have the capacity to answer this question. However, we are quite inspired by the movement in Hong Kong and adapted some of their strategies.

Frans Ari Prasetyo: Countries such as Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Cambodia, and many in Africa and Latin America face significant governance challenges. These challenges often include low GDP per capita, high levels of armed conflict, and low political stability. These nations have been trapped in a cycle of internal conflict and poor governance for decades, and it seems likely that they will continue to experience volatility across all levels of society. The current insurgency in some of these countries exemplifies the turmoil that can arise as a consequence.

When societies develop a robust state apparatus without a strong and productive domestic economy, large sectors of the population may be more susceptible to the autocratic narrative that state capacity is the key to development. Over the past decade, Indonesia has navigated a complex landscape, shifting between democracy and autocracy.

Indonesia may represent a failure of the “democratic sufficiency thesis,” which posits that democracy is essential for achieving a higher quality of life in the medium to long term. This appeared to be the case in post-1998 reform Indonesia, which emerged from 32 years of authoritarian and militaristic rule and celebrated its transition to democracy. However, it continues to face challenges in delivering a quality of life that matches its democratic standards and state capabilities. While Indonesia has been more fortunate than Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Bangladesh, and other countries in Africa and Latin America, there are concerns that the Jokowi administration may have inadvertently veered back toward militaristic authoritarianism over the past decade.

Western-style democracy is not inevitable, as history lacks a predetermined goal or purpose. Instead, history is shaped by human agency, ideological struggles, and political conflicts, with the future remaining always unwritten.

A protest in Bandung on August 28, 2024.

Can you direct us to some resources to understand the history of anarchist activity in Indonesia, and tell us concrete ways that people can support anarchists organizing there?

M: Right now, we clearly need international support to highlight the legacy of oligarchy and nepotism under Jokowi, as well as the police brutality. We urge you to condemn the Indonesian police and military for their brutal actions.

Furthermore, after reflecting on several incidents involving clashes with the police or with right-wing nationalist and conservative religious mass organizations during demonstrations or land occupations, we feel it is necessary to put more effort towards tactics during demonstrations. We plan to equip ourselves better with protective gear and to hold “trainings” to deepen our knowledge of safety, as well as field tactics for defense and attack. We also need support to sustain the street paramedics.

A protest in Bandung on August 28, 2024.

Frans Ari Prasetyo: Anarchistic groups are present throughout Indonesia. Some of these groups identify explicitly as anarchist, while others do not. Regardless of their labels, their actions align strongly with anarchist principles. As long as we share similar ideological ties and diverse strategic and practical approaches, it seems reasonable to collaborate, even if not everyone identifies as an ideological anarchist.

Anarchism offers a framework for understanding the complexities of youth activism. It provides a lens through which to examine the interconnected challenges of systemic economic inequalities, resource distribution, access to public goods, labor systems, state repression, and police-military actions. The ongoing anger towards the police and military has led to numerous confrontations and riots.

Despite its challenges, the anarchist movement has played a significant role in reshaping anti-capitalist struggles during a period marked by fragmentation and decline due to aggressive neoliberalism and resurgent authoritarianism.

Collaboration can help build a stronger movement and society. The COVID-19 crisis has established a new pattern of activism in Bandung. Civil society has adapted by forming networks that operate rhizomatically, enabling survival and resilience. I have observed and directly experienced the impact of this pattern. Since the first phase of the COVID-19 pandemic, this approach has proven to be effective, flexible, and dynamic, particularly within youth movements.

In Bandung, we use the term lintas tongkrongan (cross-hangout) to describe collaboration without hierarchy. Many young people, as elsewhere, spend significant time together, or nongkrong (hanging out). This can be a valuable source of energy and passion for civil activism, including anarchist activities.

A protest in Bandung on August 28, 2024.

What would it mean to win?

M: We’re not looking for “victory.” What we really want is for more people to realize the evils of the state, capitalism, and their instruments. We want to keep organizing autonomously, to fight injustice with direct action, and to put down roots like wild plants that can’t be stopped, not even by concrete.

Frans Ari Prasetyo: We may be approaching the issue from the wrong angle if we view victory as the ultimate goal of a struggle. We are engaged in a conflict that may not have a clear-cut resolution. If we achieve victory, it will be worth considering what happens next. There is a risk of a “false victory,” where we end up becoming something new that reflects what we fought against or defeated.

If we regard this victory as charity activism, it could lead to a change in position rather than a genuine shift. Not everyone who loses will disappear; some may adapt their methods to appear progressive, potentially turning charity into another manifestation of the class structure and inadvertently perpetuating the status quo.

In Indonesia, the 1998 Reformasi victory, which ended the 32-year militaristic-authoritarian regime of the New Order, led to the establishment of a democratic government. Could the state have done more to ensure consistent improvements in the quality of life, even with strong democratic accountability? Or was the victory simply about thwarting the election law?

We are dealing with a government, oligarchs, and predatory business and party elites who have appropriated everything belonging to the people. Therefore, we must fight as hard as we can.
The current social order, post-reforms, has been built on the victory over the New Order. The transition to civilian rule has been managed by individuals—and characterized by policies—that were part of the dictatorship.

In the past decade under President Jokowi (2014-2024), Indonesia has shifted back to an authoritarian, militaristic state known as Neo-Orba. Jokowi was initially portrayed as a populist president defending ordinary people; many former reform activists who overthrew Suharto’s New Order now support Jokowi’s Neo-Orba regime. As Jokowi’s term ends in 2024, many of these activists will switch their support to a New Order military general who once kidnapped them and was twice defeated by Jokowi in presidential elections. This general will become the next president of Indonesia, with Jokowi’s son as his vice president. This continuity of power and wealth mocks the quest for greater equality, perpetuating a cycle of inequality and exclusion.

Why should a great victory be followed by even greater demonstrations, only for those victories to justify new and more extreme forms of inequality? This reflects a trauma from the 1998 demonstrations, where the results are still unfolding today. Protests are important, and victory is a bonus, but it is crucial to build political consciousness in everyday life amid the combined hegemony of the state, capitalism, and neoliberalism. We should create grassroots alternatives, even if they start out small, and spread them across many areas in order to empower people with the freedom and justice they need daily. Building politics involves more than just engaging in spontaneous protests; it means addressing real everyday problems and developing political organs for the movement beyond merely empowering the recipients of aid.

Civil disobedience can be a powerful tool for achieving equality and signaling victory. The working class, the youth, and other civilian groups have the right to self-determination. We do not seek mere redistribution of poverty or a return to old colonial, capitalist, or neoliberal laws. Instead, we use civil disobedience to build civil and political power through education, advocacy, direct action, and solidarity. Acts of disobedience demonstrate that resistance and alternatives are possible, even as we navigate repressive laws, suffocating capitalism, and rampant neoliberalism.

Who can extinguish the fire once it has started? This regime has been playing with fire from the beginning. They can blame the protesters as much as they like, but they cannot blame the fire. I want us to stay angry, and I want the state to panic once more. See you at the next protest, and the next, and the next. Long live resistance, long live solidarity!

A protest in Bandung on August 22, 2024.


Appendix: Demonstrations around Indonesia

Courtesy of M, here follows a brief summary of the demonstrations that took place on various major islands in Indonesia August 22-27.

Jawa

Jakarta: On August 22, 2024, thousands of demonstrators gathered in front of the Indonesian Parliament (DPR RI), prompting the deployment of 3200 security personnel. Similar demonstrations took place in front of the Constitutional Court. Coinciding with this, the 828th Kamisan Action in front of the Presidential Palace also drew large crowds. Protesters carried a replica of a guillotine as a symbol of resistance against monarchy.

In the afternoon, at 14:20 Western Indonesian Time, protesters demolished the right gate of the DPR RI building. DPR member Habiburokhman was struck by a bottle thrown by demonstrators. The protest continued into the evening, with police using beatings, tear gas, and water cannons to disperse the crowd. Journalists were assaulted for attempting to cover police attacks and were forced to delete their footage.

Bandung: At 5:30 pm, protesters demolished the fence around the West Java Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) building, leading to clashes. Intelligence agents assaulted a journalist, while a student lost an eye due to a stone thrown by police.

Tasikmalaya: The protest involved the burning of several facilities at the Tasikmalaya DPRD building.

Bogor: Protests took place at Tugu Kujang.

Cirebon: A student and a police officer were injured during the demonstration in front of the Cirebon DPRD building.

Yogyakarta: Thousands gathered, starting at Abu Bakar Ali parking lot, marching to Zero Kilometer Point, and ending in front of the Special Region of Yogyakarta DPRD building.

Semarang: The protest in front of the Central Java DPRD building turned violent when protesters forced their way in, causing the fence to nearly collapse. Police used tear gas to disperse the crowd, resulting in 26 injuries, with 18 requiring hospital treatment. Protests continued until August 26, 2024, with the breach of the fence around Semarang City Hall.

Surabaya: Demonstrations took place in front of Tugu Pahlawan.

Solo: Protests occurred in front of the City Hall.

Malang: Thousands protested around the Bundaran Tugu Malang area.

Sumatera

Padang: Protests took place in front of the West Sumatra DPRD building.

Bukittinggi: On August 23, 2024, hundreds protested in front of the Bukittinggi DPRD building in heavy rain.

Lampung: The protest on the night of August 21 featured participants in Money Heist costumes.

South Sumatra: Protesters at Simpang Lima wore masks of politicians including Joko Widodo, Bahlil Lahadalia, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, Prabowo Subianto, and Bobby Nasution. They displayed a coffin in their demonstration.

Jambi: Thousands of students marched from Simpang Bank Indonesia to the parliament building in Telanai. The protest turned violent with police beatings, resulting in three people losing consciousness and four injured.

Aceh: Protests in front of the Lhokseumawe DPRK led to clashes between thousands of students and security forces. A similar protest occurred at the Aceh House of Representatives in Banda Aceh, ending in violence and five arrests.

Bengkulu: In response to protests, the security staff of the DPRD assaulted students in an effort to disperse the crowd.

Sulawesi

Makassar: Thousands protested the passage of the Regional Election Bill (RUU Pilkada), with some burning tires. The protest was dispersed when First Lady Iriana Joko Widodo was scheduled to pass by.

Kendari: Thousands of students and journalists protested in front of the Southeast Sulawesi DPRD building.

Palu: Protests occurred on August 23, 2024 in front of the Central Sulawesi DPRD building.

Nusa Tenggara

Kupang: A sit-in protest took place in front of the office of the NTT KPU (Nusa Tenggara Timur Komisi Pemilihan Umum, the General Elections Commission in East Nusa Tenggara province, the capital of which is Kupang City).

Mataram: The protest in front of the West Nusa Tenggara DPRD building turned violent after police attempted to disperse the crowd with tear gas and water cannons.

*Denpasar (Bali) **: On August 23, 2024, students from various universities, public student organizations, NGOs, LBH Bali (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum,* Community Legal Aid Institute—a frontline organization that provides legal assistance to those in need, free of charge), and others participated in a protest.

Maluku dan Papua

Ambon: The protest ended in violence with broken windows at the DPRD building after the request of the Aliansi Mahasiswa Pattimura (the Student Alliance of Pattimura University in Ambon City, in the Maluku province) to meet with coalition party members was denied due to their absence.

Manokwari: Protests were held in front of the Papua Barat DPRD building.

Sorong: A silent protest took place at Taman Sorong Park.

Kalimantan

Banjarmasin: Thousands of students from various campuses occupied the South Kalimantan DPRD building.

Samarinda: Thousands protested in front of the East Kalimantan DPRD building, demanding the cancellation of the Regional Election Bill and expedited approval of the Asset Forfeiture Bill.

Balikpapan: The protest at the Balikpapan DPRD building turned violent with clashes between students and police.

Pontianak: Students participated in an emergency democracy action at the West Kalimantan DPRD.

Palangkaraya: Hundreds of students protested, but the action ended in chaos after demands to meet with the Chairman of the Central Kalimantan DPRD were not met. The crowd rejected the conditions that only representatives could enter the DPR building to express their demands.

People in many cities continued to demonstrate after August 22, 2024.